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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Upon analysis it will be seen that practically an identical situation,
and one wherein it is extremely difficult to discover any actual con-
sideration, exists in all these cases. Moral obligation has, since the
time of Lord Mansfield, been considered insufficient to support.a
promise; any benefit accruing from or because of the former agree-
ment is obviously past consideration, hence insufficient, 12 and the
position that any support is derived from the tainted original sale
itself is untenable.13 The conclusion is seemingly inevitable that there
can be no contract, due to lack of consideration, or that ratification of
a Sunday agreement needs none. This latter argument is recognized
dearly in only one case allowing recovery,' 4 but it is often announced
as the reason for denying it.15 The real reason for running rough-
shod over these factors has been best stated in a recent opinion in
Arkansas :16 "A buyer cannot retain possession of property and use
it, then repudiate the contract as being void by reason of its execution
on Sunday."
JAmEs M. Lrrnra, JR.
Criminal Law-Statutory Construction-Aeroplane
as Motor Vehicle.
The defendant was a principal in the theft of an aeroplane and
its transportation from Canada to Oklahoma. He was indicted under
the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act,' which forbids the interstate
transportation of stolen motor vehicles. The term "motor vehicle"
is defined in such Act to include "an automobile, automobile truck,
automobile wagon, motorcycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle
not designed for running on rails." Held, the provisions of the Act
do not include an aeroplane.2
It is the general rule that penal statutes are to be strictly con-
strued.8 If the statute admits of two reasonable and contradictory
See Frey v. Fond du Lac, 24 Wis. 204, 207 (1869).
Tillock v. Webb, 56 Me. 100 (1868) ; Jones v. Belle Isle, 13 Ga. App. 437,
79 S. E. 357 (1913); see Gwinn v. Simes, 61 Mo. 335 (1875).
" Gooch v. Gooch, 178 Iowa 902, 160 N. W. 333 (1916).
15 Reeves v. Butcher, 31 N. J. L. 224 (1865) ; Ladd v. Rogers, 93 Mass. 209
(1865).
"McElhannon v. Coffman, 173 Ark. 60, 292 S. W. 393 (1927).141 STAT. 324, c. 89, §2a (1919), 18 U. S. C. A. 408 (1927).
'McBoyle v. U. S., 51 Sup. Ct 340 (March 1931), reversing 43 F. (2d)
273 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930), in which Cotteral, J., dissented.
'U. S. v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 5 L. ed. 37 (1870); Brace v. Gauger-
Korsmo Const. Co., 36 F. (2d) 661 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929), certiorari denied,
281 U. S. 738 (1930) ; State v. Crawford, 198 N. C. 522, 152 S. E. 504 (1930);
People v. Mooney, 87 Colo. 567, 290 Pac. 271 (1930).
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constructions, that operating in favor of the accused is preferred. 4
The power of prescribing punishment is in the legislature, not the
courts,5 and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give
effect to the legislative intent.6 As a guide to the intent of a statute,
the rule of ejusdem generis is widely accepted and acted upon, espe-
cially in penal statutes. 7 This rule is that where there are general
words following particular and specific words, the former must be
confined to things of the same kind or genus as those just enumer-
ated, unless there is a clear manifestation of a contrary purpose.8
Thus "other" following an enumeration of specific classes is to be
read as "other such like" and to include only others of similar char-
acter.9 This rule is applicable to the present statute and excludes
aeroplanes, which are hardly other such types of vehicles as those
specified. The rule of ejusdem generis is not applicable where the
particular words embrace all objects of their kind so that the general
words must be construed otherwise or be meaningless.1 0 But the
instant statute does not come within this exception.1 1
4 Speeter v. U. S., 42 F. (2d) 937 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930) ; Harrison v. Vose,
9 How. 372, 13 L. ed. 179 (1849); Weirich v. State, 140 Wis. 98, 121 N. W.
652 (1909).
'See U. S. v. Wiltberger, supra note 3, at 95.
*2 Lawis' SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §363 (2d ed. 1904) ; U. S.
v. Woolen, 40 F. (2d) 882 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930); State v. Barco, 150 N. C.
792, 63 S. E. 673 (1909).
"U. S. v. Nichols, 186 U. S. 298, 22 Sup. Ct. 918, 46 L. ed. 1173 (1901) ;
First National Bank of Anamoose v. U. S., 206 Fed. 374 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914) ;
U. S. v. 1150 Pounds of Celluloid, 82 Fed. 627 (C. C. A. 6th, 1897).
'2 Lwis' SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 6, §422, and
§§423-435 for illustrations; see U. S. v. Sischo, 262 Fed. 1001, 1005 (N. D.
Wash. 1919); State v. Craig, 176 N. C. 740, 744, 97 S. E. 400-401 (1918);
Yarlott v. Brown, 192 Ind. 648, 138 N. E. 17, 19 (1923) ; State v. Hemrich, 93
Wash. 439, 161 Pac. 79, 83, L. R. A. 1917B 962 (1916).
See Rhone v. Loomis, 74 Minn. 200, 204, 77 N. W. 31-32 (1898).
" U. S. v. Mescall, 215 U. S. 26, 30 Sup. Ct. 19, 54 L. ed. 77 (1909) ; Ameri-
can Ice Co. v. Fitzhugh, 128 Md. 382, 97 Atl. 999, Ann. Cas. 1917D 33 (1916) ;
U. S. Cement Co. v. Cooper, 172 Ind. 599, 88 N. E. 69 (1909) ; Note (1924) 9
IowA L. BULL. 196 (ejusdem generis rule not applied to auto insurance policies
against collision with "any other automobile, vehicle, or object").
'The following conveyances have been held vehicles within the purview of
various statutes: Emerson Troy Granite Co. v. Pearson, 74 N. H. 22, 64 At.
528 (1906) (road traction engine) ; Vincent v. Taylor Bros., 168 N. Y. S. 287,
288, 180 App. Div. 818 (1917) (threshing machine being drawn on wheels) ;
Berg v. Hetzler Bros., 166 N. Y. S. 830, 831, 179 App. Div. 551 (1917) (horse
drawn ice-scraper); Marselis v. Seaman, 21 Barb. 319, 323 (N. Y. 1856)
(sleigh) ; Tulsa Ice Co. v. Wilkes, 540 Okla. 519, 153 Pac. 1169, 1172 (1916)
(bicycle). It is submitted that "any other self-propelled vehicle" in.the pres-
ent statute refers to such conveyances as electrically-propelled cars, bicycles
with motors attached, tractors, traction engines, and the like. But for a con-
trary argument see (1930) 5 TUI.AxN L. Rav. 139.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The word "vehicle" by its derivation and definition is compre-
hensive enough to include watercraft and aircraft.12 Yet no cases
have been found including boats or aeroplanes under this general
term.' 3 Statutes intended to apply to aircraft as well as to landcraft
have expressly referred to both classes,14 as the legislature presum-
ably would have done in the instant case if such were its intent.
Statutes defining crimes are not to be extended by the courts by in-
tendment on the grounds that they should have been made more
comprehensive.' 5 "Vehicle" is understood generally to signify a
conveyance operating on land. The court in the case under discus-
sion has followed the common sense doctrine that "words of a statute
are to be interpreted in accordance with the understanding of the
common man from whose vocabulary they were taken."'16
TRvis BROWN.
Equity-Injunction Against Unauthorized Veterinary Practice.
Two veterinary surgeons brought suit in a Virginia court to re-
strain from further practice of the profession one who had obtained
his license without taking the examination required by statute. Held,
No cause of action stated'
This seems to be the first American case to reach a court of final
jurisdiction in which members of a licensed profession have sought
to cut off the competition of an unlicensed practitioner by injunction.
But an injunction was denied in a similar case by an Ohio Circuit
See MeBoyle v. U. S., 43 F. (2d) 273, 274 (C. C. A. 10, 1930).
'See Duckwall v. City of New Albany, 25 Ind. Z83, 286 (1865) (A ferry-
boat is not a vehicle. The word "vehicle" is rarely applied to watercraft) ;
Farmers' & Mechanics' National Bank v. Hanks, 104 Tex. 320, 137 S. W. 1120,
1125 (1911) (an elevator is not a vehicle); Davis v. Petrinovich, 112 Ala.
654, 21 So. 344 (1896) (vehicle defined as any carriage moving on land,
either on wheels or runners); Conder v. Griffith, 61 Ind. App. 218, 111 N. E.
816, 818 (1916) (vehicle any carriage or conveyance capable of being used as
a means of transportation on land). See definition of motor vehicle in N. C.
Pun. LAws (1927), c. 122, §1 (patterned after the Uniform Motor Vehicle
Registration Act).
1142 STAT. 854, 948 (1922), 19 U. S. C. A. §231b (1927) (including all
forms of transportation on land, water, or in air); MAss. STAT. 1923 c. 370
(referring to aircraft, watercraft, or vehicle).
"See U. S. v. Chase, 135 U. S. 255, 262, 10 Sup. Ct. 756, 758, 34 L. ed. 117,
120 (1890) ; State v. Bishop, 128 Mo. 373, 31 S. W. 9, 12, 49 Am. St. Rep. 569,
575, 29 L. R. A. 200, 208 (1895).
See U. S. v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U. S. 204, 209, 43 Sup. Ct. 338, 341,
67 L. ed. 616, 620 (1923) ; Church v. Mundy, 15 Ves. 396, 406 (1808) ; Town
of Union v. Ziller, 151 Miss. 467, 118 So. 293, 294 (1928).
'Drummond v. Rowe, 156 S. E. 442 (Va. 1931).
